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The aim of this policy paper is to critically reflect on the institutional situation and evolution of the Georgian Prosecutor's Office, within the framework of existing theoretical and comparative knowledge about the institutional arrangements of prosecutor's offices in constitutional democracies.

The first part of the policy paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the key normative principles underlying the organizational arrangements of prosecutor's offices in constitutional democracies. Specifically, it analyzes the principles of independence and accountability of prosecutor's offices, emphasizing the importance of balance and the various forms of institutional design that seek to achieve this balance.

The second chapter examines the institutional arrangement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia and its evolution from the period of gaining sovereignty from the USSR to the present day. It critically analyzes the reforms focusing on de jure institutional independence while neglecting the lack of accountability.

The third chapter explores alternative mechanisms for achieving actual independence, high accountability, and systemic political impartiality in the various institutional arrangements of prosecutor's offices from a comparative perspective.

The second part of the policy paper proposes a concept for reforming the institutional arrangement of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, based on the findings and conclusions of the first part.

See the attached file for the entire document.